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ABSTRACT

This article uses Herbert Wechsler’s 1959 Neutral Principles
address at Harvard as a lens through which to re-conceptualize the
legal history of civil rights. Derided for criticizing Brown v. Board
of Education in 1959, Wechsler first became involved in civil
rights reform in the 1930s, continued to be interested in civil rights
issues in the 1940s, and argued one of the most important civil
rights cases of the 1960s. His critique of Brown in Neutral
Principles this article maintains, derived not from a disinterest in
the black struggle but from a larger conviction that racial reform
should be process rather than rights-based. By recovering
Wechsler’s approach, this article suggests a new paradigm for
understanding the Supreme Court’s role in the civil rights
movement, one that focuses on process-based rulings like New
York Times v. Sullivan, not Brown.
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“NEUTRAL” PRINCIPLES:
RETHINKING THE LEGAL HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS,
1934-1964
ANDERS WALKER *

I INTRODUCTION
“[T]he question posed by state-enforced segregation is not
one of discrimination at all.” 1 So proclaimed Columbia law
professor Herbert Wechsler to a surprised audience at Harvard
Law School in April 1959. Hardly a southern segregationist,
Wechsler’s words suggested a shocking indifference to the plight
of African Americans in the South, not to mention a puzzling
rejection of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v.
“I find it hard to think,” Wechsler
Board of Education. 2
exclaimed, “that [Brown] really turned upon the facts.” 3
“Suppose,” he posited, “that more Negroes in a community
preferred separation than opposed it?” 4 What if, he pondered even
more bizarrely, blacks were “hurt” by integration? 5
Wechsler’s doubts about integration, and the fact that he
chose to express them just as massive resistance to Brown was
entering a decline, have puzzled scholars for almost five decades. 6
*

Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law, Yale University
Ph.D. 2003, Duke University J.D./M.A. 1998, Wesleyan University, B.A. 1994.
I would like to thank Michael Klarman and Risa Goluboff for comments,
criticism, and corrections. I would also like to thank Eric Miller, Fred Bloom,
the History Department at San Francisco State University, the American Society
for Legal History and the Midwest Regional Junior Scholars Workshop at
Washington University School of Law. Further credit goes to the Oral History
Research Office at Columbia University for allowing me to Xerox the full 362
page transcript of Geoffrey Miller and Norman Silber’s oral interviews with
Herbert Wechsler, and Kathleen Casey at Saint Louis University School of Law
for tracking down an unpublished Senate Hearing delving into Wechsler’s ties to
the National Lawyers’ Guild and the International Labor Defense in the 1930s.
1
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) [hereinafter Wechsler, Principles].
2
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3
Wechsler, Principles, supra note 1, at 33.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
For scholars who reacted negatively to Wechsler, Neutral Principles, see
Charles L. Black, Jr. The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.
J. 421 (1960); Ira Michael Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation, and
the Friendly Critics, 49 CAL. L. REV. 104 (1961); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
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Yet, they formed the basis of one of the most important law review
articles of the twentieth century. 7 “Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law,” an expanded version of Wechsler’s 1959
Harvard address, gained instant notoriety for blasting the Warren
Court’s “ad hoc” jurisprudence, meanwhile establishing firm
guidelines for how the Supreme Court should practice judicial
review. 8 Even in cases where petitioners may be sympathetic,
argued Wechsler, the Court should rely on “neutral principles” that
“transcended” immediate parties’ interests. 9
While critics have derided Wechsler for endorsing a rigid
reliance on “neutrality” at the expense of racial justice; a close
look at historical events both preceding and following his 1959
speech suggests a remarkably different thesis: Wechsler advocated
legal neutrality not to thwart racial justice, but to achieve it. As
this article will illustrate, Wechsler called for a federal
“reconstruction” of the South as early as 1934, long before the
Warren Court decided Brown. 10 Further, he endorsed federal antilynching legislation from 1934 to 1938, and personally salvaged
the defense of black communist Angelo Herndon against charges
of inciting insurrection in Georgia from 1935 to 1937. 11
During his engagement with Herndon’s case, which went to
the Supreme Court twice, Wechsler came to realize that couching
claims in neutral terms might have strategic value for black clients.
After suffering a procedural defeat before the Supreme Court in
ORTHODOXY 265-8 (1992); Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960); Richard
Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory – And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L. J.
223 (1981); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
561 (1988); Louis H. Pollak, Jr., Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A
Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959); Martin Shapiro, The
Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral
Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587 (1963); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). For the decline of massive resistance in 1959, see
NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S 320-339 (2d ed. 1997).
7
Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503
(1997); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78
COL. L. REV. 982 (1978); Fred Shapiro, The Most Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 409 (2000); Fred Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles
Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in
Constitutional Law, 92 COL. L. REV. 1 (1992).
8
See sources cited supra note 7; Wechsler, Principles, supra note 1, at 15.
9
Wechsler, Principles, supra note 1, at 17, 19.
10
Herbert Wechsler, Review of James Chadbourn’s Lynching and the Law and
Arthur Franklin Raper’s The Tragedy of Lynching, 44 YALE L. J. 191, 193
(1934) [hereinafter Wechsler, Review].
11
Id.; Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles” in the
Law: Selections From the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 854 (1993) [hereinafter Wechsler, Reminiscences].

4

1935, Wechsler downplayed Herndon’s status as an African
American male and emphasized the fact that he was a hero of
labor, directly tapping into a surge in popular support for “labor’s
rights” following the 1936 presidential election. 12 At the same
time, Wechsler re-characterized the normative basis of his client’s
appeal, arguing that instead of helping blacks mount a “revolution”
in Georgia he was in fact stabilizing majority rule, catering to
conservative fears of radical politics in the 1930s. 13 In both
instances, Wechsler downplayed Herndon’s race and emphasized
aspects of his case likely to appeal to whites, whether they
identified with the Right or the Left.
Neutrality, for Wechsler, was not simply a call for deciding
cases in a particular manner that reinforced doctrinal consistency
or upheld the “legal system’s legitimacy.” 14 Neutrality also had
strategic value. Cognizant of the depths of racism in the United
States, Wechsler used facially neutral legal arguments again and
again to advance black interests in a manner that eluded charges of
favoritism and avoided political backlash. Often, this meant
focusing on improving black access to the political process.
Inspired by the mass politics of the International Labor Defense in
the 1930s, Wechsler developed a strategic liberalism that used
federal law to undermine insurrection statutes in 1937, weaken the
white primary in 1941, and publicize black protest in 1964. 15
While constitutional theorists like John Hart Ely criticized
Wechsler’s adherence to neutral principles on the grounds that they
did “not by itself tell us anything appropriate about their content,”
12

Compare Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441
(1935)(No. 665) with Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937)(Nos. 474-475). Risa Goluboff discusses the rise of labor’s rights in RISA
GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 30 (2007).
13
Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (Nos. 474475). For the radicalization of American politics in the 1930s, see WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940,
183-4 (1963); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL: THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT, VOL. III (1961).
14
Friedman, supra note 7, at 516; See also Sunstein, supra note 7; Greenawalt,
supra note 7. This article does not maintain that Friedman, Greenawalt, and
Sunstein are wrong to assert that Wechsler possessed an interest in doctrinal
consistency and legal legitimacy. He did. What this article suggests is that
when it came to the question of advancing minority rights, Wechsler also
believed that neutrality had strategic value.
15
One claim of this article is that Wechsler represents a holdover of what
Kenneth W. Mack terms the “mass politics” and “Marxist politics” of the 1930s.
See Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Mass Politics in the Making of the Civil Rights
Lawyer, 1931-1941, 93 J. AM. HIST. 37 (2006) [hereinafter Mack, Politics];
Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering in the Era Before Brown,
115 YALE L.J. 256, 306-7 (2005) [hereinafter Mack, Rethinking]. The three
cases are Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299 (1941); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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that was precisely why Wechsler endorsed them. 16 In fact, in a
manner that prefigured Ely’s own endorsement of political process
theory, Wechsler pursued process-based approaches to civil rights
reform precisely because they appeared more neutral than claims
cast in terms of morality, racial justice, or fundamental rights. 17
Taking Herbert Wechsler’s endorsement of neutral
principles as a starting point, this article will examine Wechsler’s
engagement with the “long” civil rights movement, showing how
lessons that he learned from communists in the 1930s influenced
his approach to civil rights lawyering and legal process in the
1940s and beyond. 18 It will build on Kenneth Mack’s argument
that rights-based liberalism was not the only approach to civil
rights reform in the post-World War I era, nor was legal process as
unresponsive to civil rights as scholars like Akhil Amar contend. 19
In fact, while most scholars agree with Amar that legal process
failed to come to “grips” with civil rights, Wechsler suggests the
opposite is true. 20 As the Warren Court’s activist approach in
16

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 55 (1980).
17
Id. at 43-54. That Ely did not see a link between Neutral Principles and his
own process theory may have been due to the fact that Wechsler did not
advertise the fact that there was a strategic component to his neutral principles
argument. As this article will show, however, Wechsler prefigured Ely’s focus
on the “access” prong of political process theory. For more on the access versus
prejudice prongs, see Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political
Process Theory 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991) [hereinafter Klarman, Resistance].
18
I borrow the term “long civil rights movement” from Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s
The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past, 91 J. OF AM.
HIST. 5 (2005).
19
Though not a communist or grassroots organizer, Wechsler endorsed an
approach to reform that cast law in a supporting role to social movements,
something that Mack identifies alternately as “mass politics” or “Marxist
politics.” See Mack, Politics, supra note 15, at 302-309; Mack, Rethinking,
supra note 15, at 1, 26.
20
For a sampling of prominent scholars who argue that legal process never fully
came to terms with Brown or the civil rights movement, see Akhil Reed Amar,
Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 703 (1989) (reviewing PAUL M. BATOR, ET
AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(1988)); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Historical and Critical
Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at cxiii
(1994); HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 255; LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 42 (1996); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Mark
V. Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1979). Michael J.
Klarman is one of the few legal scholars to recognize the potential of political
process thinking for civil rights. Klarman, Resistance, supra note 17. While
some might argue that “political process” and “legal process” are not exactly the
same, Ely’s sanction of Supreme Court intervention in order to improve
minority “access” to the political process coincides closely with the emphasis
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Brown faltered, Herbert Wechsler’s strategic version of legal
process came to the rescue, directly aiding the direct action
campaigns in Mississippi and Alabama in 1964 and 1965. To
explain how this happened, this article will proceed in four parts.
Part II will show how Wechsler became interested in southern
racism in the 1930s, argued for federal intervention in the South in
1934, and developed an appreciation for the strategic deployment
of neutrality while working for the International Labor Defense
(ILD) on two separate appeals for Angelo Herndon in 1935 and
1937. Part III will show how Wechsler continued to advance
minority interests in the 1940s, by focusing on increasing minority
rights or voting access. Part IV will discuss Neutral Principles and
the events immediately leading up to Wechsler’s critique of Brown
in 1959, showing how the negative treatment of black students in
Little Rock, together with the Court’s muddled reasoning in
desegregation suits from 1954 to 1959, informed his Neutral
Principles address. Part V will show how Wechsler put theory into
practice in New York Times v. Sullivan in 1963, providing the
Supreme Court with a more strategic, process-oriented angle for
advancing black interests than the one advanced by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in
Brown.

II. DEFENDING COMMUNISTS: HERNDON’S CASE
Born in New York City in 1909, Herbert Wechsler grew up
far from black life in the American South. His grandparents on
both sides were Hungarian Jews. His father practiced law in New
York, and Wechsler himself spent his early life in the city,
attending public schools and then City College before entering
Columbia University Law School in 1928. During his second year
at Columbia, Wall Street suffered one of its most dramatic
downturns in history, triggering a severe economic depression that
would last for over a decade. 21
One year into the Great Depression, Wechsler graduated,
gained a teaching position at Columbia from 1931 to 1932 and
then, after the 1932 spring semester, won a prestigious clerkship
with former Columbia Law School Dean and Supreme Court
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone. Stone, at the time, was one of
Wechsler’s heroes. 22 His tendency to side with realist justices
that legal process theorists placed on the institutional competency of courts vis a
vis legislatures. Laura Kalman even goes so far as to argue that Ely represented
legal process theory “at its purest.” Id. at 91.
21
Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 53-58.
22
Id. at 51.
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Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis in favor of upholding
state and federal business regulations against formalist notions of
substantive due process impressed Wechsler, who possessed an
“unqualified disdain” for the Court’s Lochner-era jurisprudence. 23
Wechsler viewed the conservatives on the Court, men like George
Sutherland, Pierce Butler and James C. McReynolds to be
undemocratic, meanwhile admiring Stone, Brandeis and Holmes
for supporting progressive business regulations and Roosevelt’s
ambitious New Deal. 24
While Wechsler admired Stone for supporting the New
Deal, he did not view him to be a champion of minority rights. 25
Though the Republican Justice would later become famous for
suggesting that the Constitution be read to protect “discrete and
insular minorities” in 1938, the parties most responsible for
bringing questions of minority rights to national attention in 1932
were communists. 26 This became clear in 1931, when the
Communist Party USA, the Young Communist League, and the
Communist Party’s legal advocacy wing, the International Labor
Defense, or ILD, took up the case of nine African American
defendants falsely accused of raping two white women in
Scottsboro, Alabama. 27
The ILD won representation of the defendants over
NAACP and waged a massive political campaign to raise
awareness for the “Scottsboro boys.” 28 Convinced that litigation
alone would fail, the ILD advocated “mass action outside of courts
and legislative bodies,” staging protests, rallies and demonstrations
to free the nine black defendants. 29 From 1931 to 1932, the ILD
and its communist allies held mass demonstrations in Chicago and
23

Id. at 50.
Id. Stone’s support of the New Deal was qualified. He feared the manner in
which Roosevelt accumulated power during the New Deal, even as he came to
recognize the necessity of at least some degree of government control of private
industry. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE
LAW (1956), 371, 446, 544.
25
Herbert Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution, 46 COL. L. REV. 764, 795
(1946) [hereinafter Wechsler, Stone].
26
DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969);
GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL
RIGHTS, 1919-1950 (2008); ROBIN D. G. KELLEY, HAMMER AND HOE:
ALABAMA COMMUNISTS DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1990); CHARLES H.
MARTIN, THE ANGELO HERNDON CASE AND SOUTHERN JUSTICE (1963);
HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL ISSUE, THE DEPRESSION DECADE (1978); PATRICIA
SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE: RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW DEAL ERA
(1996).
27
SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 146.
28
CARTER, supra note 26, at 54-100; SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 87-88;
(SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 146-47 (1978).
29
SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 148; CARTER supra note 26, at 59, 141-3, 244.
24
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New York, staged a mass rally in front of the White House, and
even sent the mothers of the Scottsboro boys on a national tour. 30
Meanwhile, the ILD and the Communist Party churned out reams
of propaganda in publications like The Daily Worker and New
Masses, propaganda that, by 1932, bled into more mainstream
publications like The Nation, the New Republic and the New York
Times. 31 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, in the
fall of 1932, figures as disparate as Albert Einstein, H.G. Wells,
and Maxim Gorky were speaking out against the persecution of the
nine defendants. 32
In what appeared to be a direct response to the political
pressure applied by the ILD, the Supreme Court intervened to help
the Scottsboro boys. 33 In November 1932, while Wechsler was
clerking for Stone, otherwise conservative Justice George
Sutherland reversed and remanded the convictions of the nine
African American defendants, applying the Fourteenth
Amendment to extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in
Though Stone joined
death penalty cases to the states. 34
Sutherland’s opinion, Wechsler left his clerkship the following
spring convinced not that his Justice had pioneered the struggle for
racial equality, but that the ILD had. 35
As the ILD returned to the Deep South to continue fighting
for the Scottsboro boys, Wechsler brought a newfound concern for
racial injustice with him North to Columbia. In 1934, Wechsler
came out in favor of federal anti-lynching legislation in the
prominent Yale Law Journal. 36 Lynching, a problem that had
gradually been in decline in Dixie, spiked in 1930 and continued to
rise through 1932 and 1933. 37 This violence led to a surge in antilynching activism as the NAACP pushed for the enactment of a
federal anti-lynching bill and New Deal liberals like Will
Alexander, then employed by the Roosevelt administration, formed
a commission to study the problem. 38
30

SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 146; CARTER supra note 26, at 146-7, 248-251.
SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 87-8; SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 146-147.
32
SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 147.
33
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). While it is impossible to know
whether the ILD actually influenced the Court, the organization’s campaign did
impress Wechsler.
34
Id.
35
Wechsler recalled Stone’s attitude towards minority rights to be one of
relative “ambivalence” in the early 1930s, not truly congealing around the idea
of protecting minority access to the political process until 1938. This stood in
marked contrast to the communist intervention on behalf of southern blacks in
1931. Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 154.
36
Wechsler, Review supra note 10, at 193.
37
SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 244-5.
38
SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 270-4; SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 24-5.
Interestingly, one of the authors of the Costigan-Wagner Anti-lynching bill
31
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In a review of two books on lynching sponsored by
Alexander’s commission, Wechsler argued that “significant
reconstruction” of the South was necessary and that federal
legislation was “[f]ar more” likely to achieve reform than solutions
sponsored by southern states. 39 In fact, Wechsler strongly
advocated federal judicial intervention in southern affairs, noting
that federal prosecutors “answerable to Washington,” federal
judges “enjoying life tenure” and federal jurors “drawn from a
higher economic and social stratum” promised to be much more
effective than “the southern legislator.” 40 Further, if anyone
regarded the question of race relations in the South “as local and
unfit for federal action,” continued Wechsler, they should “reread
the Fourteenth Amendment.” 41
These were remarkable claims. Not only did Wechsler
express a considerable degree of support for federal intervention in
the South, a position that contradicted his earlier anti-Lochner
aversion to judicial intervention in state affairs, he even anticipated
a second “reconstruction” of the region, something that would not
come to fruition until the 1960s. Further, Wechsler endorsed a
bold reading of the Fourteenth Amendment in favor of racial
minorities, something that the Supreme Court would not engage in
until the 1950s. Four years before his mentor Harlan Fiske Stone
articulated a concern for discrete and insular minorities in footnote
4 of Carolene Products, 42 Wechsler articulated an express interest
in using federal power to ameliorate the injustices suffered by
southern blacks. Not only did he see a need to stop lynching, he
lamented “the political impotence” that black voters suffered under
poll taxes, literacy tests, and other modes of disfranchisement. 43
He also derided the “unequal allocation of public funds devoted to
educational purposes” several years before the Supreme Court
would begin to consider such matters in Gaines v. Canada. 44
Further, Wechsler suggested that the government do more than
simply enact voting laws, school equalization requirements and
anti-lynching measures. The “job of the government” noted
Wechsler, was nothing less than “the creation of a more abundant
life for the negro.” 45
That Wechsler declared the government’s job to be
improving black life was remarkable, particularly at a moment
turned out to be Columbia University Law Professor Karl Llewellyn, a colleague
and former professor of Herbert Wechsler. SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 281.
39
Wechsler, Review, supra note 10, at 193.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
43
Wechsler, Review, supra note 10, at 193.
44
Id. at 191; State of Mo. ex rel .Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
45
Wechsler, Review supra note 10, at 191.
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when southern segregationists seemed more determined than ever
to retain white supremacy. Nowhere was this more obvious than in
the context of lynching. 46 From 1934 to 1938, as lynching spiked
in the South, the NAACP mounted campaigns to push the very
anti-lynching bills that Wechsler endorsed through Congress, often
publicizing gruesome details of southern lynchings to do so. 47 To
take just one example, only a few months before Wechsler’s Yale
Law Journal piece went to press, the NAACP advertised the brutal
murder of an African American named Claude Neal at the hands of
a white mob in Northwest Florida.48 Neal, suspected of raping a
white farmer’s daughter near Marianna, had been retrieved by a
mob from a jail in neighboring Alabama and brought back to
Florida only to have his fingers, toes, and genitals cut off before
being hung from a tree outside the county courthouse. 49 The
NAACP produced a pamphlet describing the murder and
distributed it nationally in an attempt to boost support for an antilynching bill. 50
Though the NAACP would continue to publicize southern
atrocities through the 1930s, southern intransigence in the Senate
foiled every attempt. 51 This failure, caused in part by Senate rules
allowing a minority of states to thwart majority will through
procedural devices like the filibuster, convinced Wechsler that
American federalism posed profound challenges to the
advancement of black rights. It also pushed him, later in his
career, to argue that America’s federal system, thanks not only to
the “filibuster” but also to “seniority” rules in the Senate, was well
protected by political “safeguards” rendering southern concerns
over federal domination redundant. 52
Given that “political safeguards” written into the
Constitution made national legislation on behalf of southern blacks
difficult, Wechsler looked for other ways to ameliorate racism in
Dixie. Interestingly, he found one in the ILD. Though no
communist, Wechsler drew inspiration from the ILD’s
commitment to grassroots protest and mass politics, even as he
became inspired by the ILD’s tendency to frame racial injustice in
ostensibly “neutral” terms that were unlikely to invoke a
conservative backlash. The core principle at stake in Powell v.
Alabama, after all, was one that few could disagree with: indigent
46

Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition of the National Government, 54 COL. L. REV. 543
(1954)[hereinafter Wechsler, Safeguards].
47
SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 277-88.
48
Id. at 286.
49
“They Done Me Wrong,” TIME, Nov. 5, 1934; SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 286.
50
SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 286.
51
Id. at 284, 287-88.
52
Wechsler, Safeguards, supra note 46, at 548.
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clients, regardless of color, deserved legal counsel before the state
could put them to death. 53
Largely because of his admiration for the ILD’s work in the
Scottsboro case, Wechsler responded positively to ILD lawyer
Carol Weiss King when she asked him for help on a case involving
a black communist in Georgia. 54 The communist, an African
American named Angelo Herndon had been arrested by Georgia
authorities in 1932 for possessing documents advocating a blackled “revolution” in the Deep South; an act that led him to be
charged with inciting insurrection. 55 While Herndon’s charge
rested on his possession of written material, a relatively innocuous
act, authorities were aware that he had helped organize a
demonstration of the unemployed in Atlanta only a month before,
thereby evincing an arguably more militant show of commitment
to social change. Also, Herndon had been involved in communist
organizing in neighboring Alabama for several years, and had even
worked on the ILD’s campaign to free the Scottsboro nine.56
Hoping that Herndon’s case might become another
Scottsboro, the ILD rushed to help Herndon in Georgia. 57
Unfortunately, the ILD’s trial attorneys met ironclad resistance at
the state level, resulting in a sentence of eighteen to twenty years
on a chain gang for Herndon. 58 The penalty’s severity prompted
Carol Weiss King to approach Wechsler through his colleague
Walter Gellhorn at Columbia, in the hopes of mounting a more
robust federal appeal. 59 While Wechsler was eager to work on the
case, he was not yet eligible to argue before the Supreme Court, a
factor that led the ILD to recruit New York Republican and former
Hoover official Whitney North Seymour, who Wechsler knew
from Washington, to make the oral arguments. 60
53

Powell, 287 U.S. 45, 71.
Charles Martin maintains that it was Walter Gellhorn, one of Wechsler’s
colleagues, who approached him about representing Herndon. This contradicts
Wechsler’s memory of events. Wechsler recalls that Carol Weiss King contacted
him, Gellhorn, and Jerome Michael at roughly the same time about aiding
Herndon’s case. Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 125; but see
MARTIN, supra note 26, at 140.
55
SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 150.
56
MARTIN, supra note 26, at 10.
57
Id. at 12-14.
58
Id. at 61.
59
Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 125.
60
Also involved in the Herndon case from Columbia Law School was
Wechsler’s colleague Walter Gellhorn. According to some accounts, Carol
Weiss King approached Gellhorn, who then approached Wechsler. According
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Herndon’s appeal proved to be a substantial commitment
for Wechsler, one that lasted from 1934 to 1937. It also proved to
be an education on the intersection between federalism and black
protest, forcing Wechsler to develop a theory of how the
Fourteenth Amendment might be used to protect black activists
like Herndon in the South. Though only one of what would
eventually become six lawyers on Herndon’s team, Wechsler later
recalled writing the “bulk” of Herndon’s legal briefs himself,
documents that, much like Wechsler’s 1934 Yale Law Journal
piece, suggest a remarkable awareness of the black struggle in the
South. 61 For example, Wechsler’s first brief began with a legal
history of slavery and Reconstruction in Georgia, showing how the
colony abandoned its initial opposition to slavery in 1750, moved
to increasing regulation of slaves and free blacks over the course of
the eighteenth century, and eventually enacted its first antiinsurrection statute in 1804 midst fears that “free Negroes,”
“Spanish invaders,” and “hostile Indians,” might “arouse” the slave
population “to insurrection.” 62 Never completely confident that its
slaves were content, Georgia reinscribed its insurrection statute in
1817, 1833, and 1861. Then, Georgia reenacted its statute to meet
what Wechsler called the “special and unprecedented” dangers that
Georgia faced following the Civil War, including fears that
disgruntled ex-Confederates, or what he termed “die-hard
secessionists,” “jayhawkers,” and “incipient Ku Kluxers,” might
use physical violence to overthrow Georgia’s Republican
government. 63
“So great were the fears of disorder and
insurrection,” argued Wechsler, that the Georgia Constitutional
Convention recommended formation of a statewide police force
while the state legislature passed the insurrection act that was used
against Herndon. 64
After completing his history of Georgia, Wechsler argued
that the “dangers then facing the South” had “passed,” and that
Herndon, who had organized at best “five or six actual members”
of the communist party in Georgia, posed no actual threat to the
state. 65 In fact, Wechsler maintained that even though Herndon
possessed documents calling for a black-led “revolution” in the
memory, which is that he enlisted Wechsler and Gellhorn to aid in him in
preparing the briefs. MARTIN, supra note 26, at 140-42.
61
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South, this word simply described “a new political or economic
program” that did not involve the use of “force.” 66 Once he
established that Herndon did not envision using force to effect a
black revolution in the South, Wechsler invoked Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test to challenge the
prevailing Supreme Court rule for determining when states could
infringe on a citizen’s First Amendment rights. That rule,
established in 1925 by Gitlow v. New York, 67 held that a
defendant’s speech need not represent a “clear and present danger”
to established government, but need only “tend to subvert or
imperil” that government. 68 This “bad tendency,” or “dangerous
tendency” test, as it came to be known, meant that states did not
have to measure when a defendant’s conduct would actually lead
to revolt, if it ever did. 69 “The State,” the Gitlow Court held, could
not be required to measure the danger of every radical’s utterances
“in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale,” but rather should seek to
control all revolutionary rhetoric given that a “single revolutionary
spark” could quickly “burst into a sweeping and destructive
conflagration.” 70
Though two decades of Supreme Court decisions were
against him, Wechsler gambled that he could use the clear and
present danger doctrine to create a more robust shield against state
intrusions on black protest. 71 Relying on an argument advanced by
Harvard Law Professor Zachariah Chafee in 1919, Wechsler
argued that in order for a jury to decide that Herndon posed a
“clear and present danger” it would have to find that he posed an
immediate, violent threat to the state. 72 Anything else, he argued,
would be an exercise in pure speculation, an attempt to “imagine”
Herndon’s influence on “hypothetical communities.” 73 This, in
Wechsler’s opinion, was unreasonable. “Due process,” he noted
eloquently, “denies clairvoyance so major a role in determining
liability.” 74
Georgia disagreed. 75 To it, clairvoyance was not the issue
so much as common sense. After all, Herndon had been found
with literature advocating that land held by whites be “confiscated
and turned over to the negroes.” 76 Herndon had also been found
66
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with literature calling for the formation of a new independent
“black belt” state in the Deep South where African Americans
possessed the “complete right of self determination.” 77 A more
threatening proposal to white government in the South would be
hard to imagine.
And, according to Herbert Wechsler, blacks had ample
tools at their disposal to effect revolutionary change. These
included “mass actions” and “demonstrations,” both of which the
civil rights movement would eventually use in the 1960s. 78
Interested in creating constitutional room for radical black protest
in the South, Wechsler’s argument thrust “the jeweler’s scale” onto
Georgia authorities, forcing them to prove that black activists were
actually on the verge of inciting violent rebellion. Of course, this
left the door wide open for activists like Herndon to organize
demonstrations, strikes, and any other type of peaceful “mass
action” that they saw fit in order to effect change, free from
prosecution under Georgia’s insurrection statute. That such
organizing might lead to an “overthrow” of the government was
irrelevant, so long as that overthrow was “peaceful.” 79 Further, the
fact that whites might resort to violence in order to stop the
“revolution” was also irrelevant, so long as the demonstrators did
not engage in violence themselves. 80
Firmly embedded in Wechsler’s first brief on behalf of
Angelo Herndon was nothing less than a constitutional strategy for
protecting the process through which blacks would ultimately
achieve reform in the South in the 1960s. Barred from voting,
blacks still retained a variety of means for achieving reform,
particularly if they did not fear prosecution for insurrection. 81 By
raising the state’s burden of proof on insurrection charges,
Wechsler opened the door for more aggressive protest in Georgia,
and arguably the rest of the South as well.
The radical possibilities that went with allowing peaceful
“insurrection” in the South alarmed more than just Georgia
authorities. In fact, Zachariah Chafee, Jr., the very constitutional
theorist who had laid the foundations for Wechsler’s protective use
of the clear and present danger standard, also came to fear the kind
77
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of revolution that Herndon in particular might spark. Out of “all
the chief sedition defendants” of the early twentieth century, noted
Chafee, “all but one” seemed “harmless.” 82 The only one that
Chafee believed actually posed a “clear and present danger” to the
state was Herndon. 83 Like Wechsler, Chafee realized that African
Americans in the South were not just ready for change, but
possessed a variety of methods for effecting it. Unlike Wechsler,
however, who did not seem to think that such change would
devolve into violence, Chafee feared that black revolution would
lead quickly to a southern race war. 84 “Smoking is alright,”
warned Chafee in a veiled allusion to black protest, “but not in a
powder magazine.” 85
The Supreme Court, perhaps sharing some of Chafee’s
concerns, proved reluctant to release Herndon. In a procedural
dodge, the Court rejected Herndon’s appeal on the technical
ground that Herndon’s attorneys had not raised the constitutional
challenge to Georgia’s insurrection statute successfully at trial. 86
Though technically correct, the Court ignored the fact that the
Georgia appellate court had actually changed its interpretation of
the insurrection statute after trial, raising issues regarding its
constitutionality that Herndon’s trial attorneys could not possibly
have anticipated. 87
Angered by this clear avoidance of the constitutional
question, Wechsler personally began digging through Georgia state
law to find some alternate ground for carrying Herndon’s case
forward. 88 Interestingly, he discovered a Georgia law that kept
state petitions of habeas corpus open in cases where questions
concerning a statute’s constitutionality existed but had not been
addressed at trial. 89 Convinced that Herndon’s was such an
instance, Wechsler drafted a habeas corpus petition and convinced
Whitney North Seymour to continue with the suit. Seymour
agreed, re-enlisting two prominent Atlanta attorneys, William A.
Sutherland and Elbert Tuttle, who argued the petition in Georgia
and won at the trial level. 90 Though the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed, the United States Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s
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decision, overturning Herndon’s conviction under Georgia’s
insurrection statute in April 1937. 91
At first glance, Herndon’s sudden victory seemed to have
had little to do with Wechsler’s brief-writing. On the same day
that Lowry came up for oral argument, President Roosevelt
publicly announced a plan to pack the Court with a new justice for
every judge on the bench who was over seventy. 92 This “courtpacking plan” as it came to be known, sought to pressure the
Justices into endorsing ambitious New Deal programs that pushed
traditional boundaries of federal power. 93 To many, the plan also
pushed the Court to take a different view of cases brought by
minority plaintiffs seeking civil rights like Angelo Herndon. 94
Yet, Roosevelt never suggested that he wanted the Court to
begin protecting black plaintiffs from southern racism. 95 In fact,
the President had refused to publicly endorse anti-lynching
legislation precisely because he was worried about alienating the
segregationist wing of the Democratic Party in the South. 96
Further, even if Roosevelt had secretly wanted the Court to assume
the burden of protecting racial minorities in the South, there was
little evidence that his Court packing plan would have that desired
effect. 97 Not only did the plan stumble in Congress, but it failed to
muster substantial popular support nationally.98
A more careful study of the Court suggests that its shift
towards Herndon had less to do with the court-packing plan than
with the manner in which Herbert Wechsler recast Herndon’s case.
Thanks to his own research, for example, Wechsler found a clear
statutory basis for challenging the constitutionality of Georgia’s
insurrection law, a move that Herndon’s initial attorneys had
arguably failed to do. For justices like Hughes and Roberts, who
had expressed sympathy for minority clients and civil liberties in
91
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the past, Wechsler’s work might have pushed them to decide in
Herndon’s favor on the law alone. 99
Another possible reason the Supreme Court might have
taken a second look at Herndon is that Wechsler re-characterized
his case in a manner that coincided with a surge in judicial support
for “labor’s rights” following the 1936 presidential election. 100
For example, Wechsler lifted a discussion of the demonstration
that Herndon had organized in Atlanta out of the footnotes and into
the main text, making sure to note that Herndon had been
demonstrating not just for blacks but for “unemployment relief”
and “unemployment insurance” for all workers. 101 Further,
Wechsler made sure to note that while some of Herndon’s
literature advocated the creation of a black state, a terrifying
proposition to southern whites, the sum of Herndon’s material
merely endorsed the “peaceful organization of the unemployed.” 102
Both modifications coincided with a surge in union membership
and labor organizing following Roosevelt’s 1936 presidential
victory, a political development that was accompanied by a spike
in pro-labor decisions on the Supreme Court. 103
In addition to Wechsler’s strategic revisions, another factor
that may have contributed to Herndon’s victory in 1937 was the
ILD. 104 Just as it had with the Scottsboro boys, the ILD mounted a
99
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campaign of demonstrations, propaganda and mass protest in favor
of Herndon. During the summer of 1935, for example, the ILD
arranged for Herndon to tour the west coast, even building a cage
like the ones used to house prisoners on Georgia chain gangs to
That October, the ILD held a mass
accompany him. 105
demonstration in New York during which Herndon himself argued
that the Supreme Court had denied his appeal not on legal
deficiencies but in order to keep “white and Negro workers from
organizing” in the Deep South. 106 Herndon’s fusion of the black
struggle in the Deep South with the struggle of labor generally cast
his own case in a broader light, one that implicated the Supreme
Court’s initial decision against him as part of a larger move to
suppress labor and the New Deal. Similar fusions of black civil
rights and labor spiked from 1935 to 1937, as the ILD reached out
to prominent organizations like the NAACP and the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), to build support for Herndon’s
case. 107
Even as the ILD worked to build a political coalition on the
Left, Wechsler also added a twist to his argument that promised to
appeal to the Right. Citing De Jonge v. Oregon, a Supreme Court
opinion issued in January 1937, Wechsler noted that it was
“imperative 108 ” that the government not crack down on political
protestors like Herndon, precisely so that it could remain
“responsive to the will of the people.” 109 So long as the
government remained responsive to the “people,” argued
Wechsler, it would not alienate them, thereby ensuring that
political reforms were pursued through “peaceful means.” 110 This
last claim was strategic. By linking Herndon’s case to the
preservation of order, Wechsler provided the Court with an
opportunity to save Herndon on essentially conservative grounds,
namely the absorption of radical politics into the mainstream
political process. 111 Wechsler also provided the Court with an
University. Id. Herndon also addressed a crowd of over 20,000 people at
Madison Square Garden in New York City in November 1936, denouncing
racism in the South and fascism abroad. Fascism is Issue, Browder Contends, N.
Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1936, p. 18. See GILMORE, supra note 26, at 67-105, 112154.
105
MARTIN, supra note 26, at 154.
106
Herndon Cheered as Martyr by 2,000, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1935, p. 15.
107
MACK, Mass Politics, supra note 16, at 44-46; SITKOFF, supra note 26, at
148-89.
108
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
109
Brief for the Appellant at *32, Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (Nos.
474 and 475).
110
Id. (citing DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)).
111
At the time, this was a compelling argument given that radical politics
seemed to be growing in the United States, leading some to fear assaults on
private property and the political process. David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt

19

opportunity to reinforce democracy in the South, transforming
what was essentially a black minority claim into a defense of
popular “will.” 112
Evidence that Wechsler’s re-characterization of Herndon’s
case did in fact influence the Supreme Court emerged in Justice
Roberts’ decision, which coincided closely with Wechsler’s
brief. 113 Not only did Roberts blast Georgia’s insurrection statute
for serving as a “dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates
for change,” but Roberts sanctioned Wechsler’s notion that a ruling
for Herndon was a ruling for the stability of the democratic process
by citing DeJonge v. Oregon. 114 Conversely, Georgia’s argument
that agitators like Herndon might incite violent backlashes, a
Cassandra-like prophecy given the manner in which civil rights
gains would be won in the 1960s, emerged nowhere in Roberts’s
opinion. 115
Herndon, though couched as a victory for democracy and
labor, represented a procedural win for blacks. By undermining
the criminal offense of insurrection, it widened avenues for African
Americans in the Deep South to pursue grassroots organizing and
reform. Already, this was beginning to happen as communist
organizers like Herndon were operating in Deep South states like
Georgia, Louisiana and Alabama, at the same time that left leaning
centers like the Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee
were beginning to educate black and white members of the
working class. 116
Though Congress confronted obstacles to providing direct
aid to blacks in the South thanks to “political safeguards” like the
senatorial filibuster, Wechsler realized that the Supreme Court
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could ease the burden on political organizing at the grassroots
level, increasing the possibility that change might come from
below. Interestingly, such thinking did in fact appear to influence
the Supreme Court. One year after Wechsler made his strategic
appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone cited
Herndon v. Lowry in a footnote suggesting that state measures
which restricted the “political processes” necessary for protecting
“minorities” deserved closer scrutiny. 117
The footnote came in a case that challenged a federal
statute prohibiting the sale of “filled” milk, meaning skimmed milk
augmented by other ingredients to make it appear whole. 118 While
Justice Stone held that the federal law was a reasonable exercise of
federal regulatory power, he reserved the right to apply more strict
scrutiny to measures that were either “directed at” racial
minorities, or impinged on the “political processes” ordinarily
relied on to “bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.” 119
Because Stone cited Herndon v. Lowry in his footnote, Wechsler
came to believe that the Court was moving down a path towards
protecting minority involvement in the political process that he had
helped pave. 120 In fact, Wechsler later remembered Lowry to be
“important” precisely because it established a “foundation” for
how the First Amendment might be given “some meaning and
teeth,” not simply as an abstract right, but as a vehicle for
achieving “historical fidelity” to the initial “impulse” behind the
Fourteenth Amendment. 121 While Wechsler had repositioned
Herndon as a hero of labor not race, he nevertheless retained his
view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s initial “impulse” meant
helping African Americans in the South, something that he had
noted in his 1934 Yale Law Journal piece. 122 In fact, Wechsler
took Herndon to be part of what he called a “second revolution” in
117
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American constitutional law, a restoration of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a tool for aiding the plight of African Americans in
the United States. 123
That Wechsler saw his work in Herndon v. Lowry to be part
of the foundation for footnote 4 of Carolene Products is
significant. Among other things, it places him – along with his
former mentor Harlan Fiske Stone – at the ground level of an
approach to judicial review that would later become known as
“process theory.” 124 According to process theory’s most articulate
proponent, constitutional scholar John Hart Ely, footnote 4 of
Carolene Products provided nothing less than a justification for
judicial review that existed independently of notions of
fundamental rights or constitutional text.125 Predicated on the need
for a functioning democracy, process theory took footnote 4’s
second and third paragraphs and separated them into two separate
prongs: the first sanctioning judicial intervention to guarantee
access to the political process generally and the second sanctioning
judicial intervention to bolster “those political processes” aimed at
protecting “discrete and insular minorities” from majority
prejudice. 126
Though he predated Ely by a generation, Wechsler believed
strongly that courts should reinforce minority access to the
political process. His work in Herndon v. Lowry, for example,
aimed to protect black organizers and demonstrators in Georgia
from being prosecuted for insurrection, a move predicated on an
expansive notion that included political protest, not just voting. To
Wechsler, this expansive vision of the political process derived
directly from the “mass politics” of the ILD in the 1930s, a politics
that relied heavily on grassroots organizing and demonstration to
build popular support for constitutional reform. 127
Interestingly, even though Wechsler endorsed the “access”
prong of footnote 4 he would never feel completely comfortable
endorsing footnote 4’s “prejudice” prong, meaning the position
that courts should intervene directly to protect minorities from
majority abuse. This too was linked to his civil rights work in the
1930s. Unlike later process theorists, Ely perhaps foremost among
123
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them, Wechsler never believed that courts could go against
majority will, even in extreme cases of flagrant abuse of
minorities. To him, judicial defiance of majority will invited
retaliation, whether the kind embodied in Roosevelt’s courtpacking plan or more subtle forms like congressionally mandated
“jurisdiction stripping” legislation. 128 This was an element of
Wechsler’s thinking that led him both to critique the Warren Court
and to help guide it out of the political thicket in 1959. Regardless
of the Supreme Court’s perceived power, Wechsler remained
convinced that it occupied a “subordinate” position in the
American political process, a position that demanded judges move
strategically on matters dealing with minority rights. 129
Wechsler’s attention to the institutional competency of
courts, particularly their subordinate relationship to the other
political branches, made him a progenitor not just of process-based
approaches to civil rights reform, but a larger school of thought
known as “legal process” theory. 130 Proponents of legal process,
including scholars like Albert M. Sacks and Henry M. Hart, with
whom Wechsler would co-write a legendary federal courts
casebook, all believed that courts should proceed cautiously when
entering areas of law that lent themselves to value-laden, policystyle judgments. 131 If they did enter such areas, legal process
theorists like Henry Hart believed they needed to do so with
“reasoned elaboration” of the constitutional principles upon which
such action rested. 132 Relying on sociological data, as extreme
proponents of legal realism advocated, was not enough. 133 Nor
was a simple conviction that constitutional results be moral or fair.
This adherence to legal formality, though often derided as
conservative and reactionary by later proponents of Warren Court
activism, aligned process theorists with early proponents of
judicial restraint, men like Felix Frankfurter who rejected the
Court’s ambitious invalidation of state and federal law during the
Lochner era. 134
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Frankfurter, like Stone, was one of Wechsler’s early
heroes.
His academic writings and legal opinions reinforced
many of the lessons that Wechsler learned from the ILD, among
them the notion that courts alone could not effect reform. 136
Frankfurter also impressed upon Wechsler the notion that courts
could not withstand majority will for long, and should strive for
process rather than rights-based reform. 137
Frankfurter’s influence helps explain why Wechsler
couched Angelo Herndon’s second appeal in terms of popular
“will.” 138 It also explains his interest in protecting minority
protest; a device that he believed could be used, like the ILD
believed it could, to influence majority opinion. In fact, this
explains Wechsler’s strategy, and success, in Herndon v. Lowry.
In essence, Wechsler embraced a robust type of democratic mass
politics, one in which minorities would be allowed, even
encouraged to develop creative means of building popular support
for their causes, even if it meant incurring violence. This approach
appealed to Wechsler for several reasons. One, it helped
minorities without making the Court appear biased towards them.
Two, it promoted minority interests without ostensibly
undermining majority rule, or established constitutional law.
While Wechsler recognized that the Constitution sanctioned
judicial review, for example, he also understood the potential
unpopularity, even political backlash that courts might incur when
they defied majority will. Not only might court decisions be
ignored, Wechsler recognized, but elected officials could pose a
variety of threats to the Court’s autonomy. President Roosevelt
made this painfully clear in 1937 by threatening to increase the
number of justices to bolster his New Deal programs. Though
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan failed to gain sufficient
congressional support, Wechsler became interested in other ways
that “legislators” might modify the “norms” governing judicial
review, particularly stripping federal courts of their jurisdiction. 139
In fact, Wechsler wrote an entire chapter dealing with
“congressional control of jurisdiction” in the federal courts
casebook that he co-authored with Hart in 1953. 140
135
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The rough and tumble constitutional politics of the 1930s
convinced Herbert Wechsler that “in the end” all constitutional
strategies for helping minorities in a democratic system had to be
This meant that reformers had to think
“utilitarian.” 141
strategically about the type of constitutional arguments that they
advanced, not to mention the manner in which those arguments
were likely to be received by judges and voters. “Votes,” believed
Wechsler, were ultimately “determinative” in democratic systems,
even when it came to the implementating judicial decisions. 142
Though Wechsler sympathized with the notion that courts
should protect the interests of “discrete and insular” minorities,
particularly racial minorities, he did not think that courts could
withstand majority pressure for long, as a matter of political
reality. Consequently, by the time that Wechsler’s old mentor
Harlan Fiske Stone penned footnote 4 of Carolene Products in
1938 his former law clerk had already begun to articulate strategic
ways of protecting the process through which minorities might
effect grassroots change. In Herndon v. Lowry, Wechsler
advanced creative expansions of the First Amendment to weaken
insurrection laws, an age-old tool for crushing black protest in the
South.
Herndon v. Lowry did something else as well; it convinced
Herbert Wechsler that augmenting litigation with mass politics, as
the ILD sought to do through demonstrations and propaganda,
could prepare the public for constitutional reform, even the
invalidation of popular law. By the time of Herndon’s second
appeal, for example, Wechsler remembered that even “lots of
people in Georgia were uncomfortable” with the fact that Herndon
had received a “long sentence” but had not received “a hearing on
the constitutional claims involved.” 143 Had Wechsler worked for
the NAACP, he might not have gained the same appreciation for
merging litigation and mass politics. Throughout the 1930s, many
considered the ILD to be an even more “outspoken” defender of
black rights than the NAACP, a position bolstered not only by its
defense of Angelo Herndon, but its even more sensational defense
of the Scottsboro nine. 144 While the NAACP proved reluctant to
mix litigation and protest, the ILD held mass demonstrations in
favor of the Scottsboro boys in northern cities like New York, even
as it mounted a vigorous legal defense, all the while maintaining
that “confidence in the courts” alone could never bring
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“justice.” 145 For true reform to occur, in other words, the ILD
believed that grassroots political activism, including mass
demonstrations like those held in favor of the Scottsboro boys and
Angelo Herndon, had to accompany judicial appeals.
The ILD’s fusion of litigation and mass politics influenced
Wechsler’s thinking on civil rights for the rest of his career. Even
through the 1950s and 1960s, he never abandoned the position that
courts alone could not achieve social change, and that reform on
behalf of minorities required at least some degree of majority
support. He also retained his interest in preserving minority access
to the political process. In fact, as the next section will show,
Wechsler continued to pursue a process-based approach to
advancing minority interests in the 1940s, setting the stage for his
critique of Brown in 1959.

III. UNITED STATES V. CLASSIC AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Three years after Herbert Wechsler helped Angelo Herndon
gain his freedom from a Georgia chain gang, he returned to the
question of racial politics in the American South. Yet, he did so in
what could only be described as a racially neutral way. In
September 1940, a grand jury indicted four election commissioners
in New Orleans for tampering with votes in a primary race for
United States Congress. 146 The indictment alleged that the
election commissioners had violated the constitutional rights of
United States citizens to have their votes counted pursuant to
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution by conspiring to alter
ballots and falsify vote counts. 147
The citizens in question were all supporters of Paul H.
Maloney and Jacob Young, two democrats challenging T. Hale
Boggs for New Orleans’ congressional seat. 148 Though not a case
about race discrimination, 149 the Democratic primary in Louisiana,
like the Democratic primary in other southern states, essentially
operated as a de facto election process from which blacks were
barred. 150 This meant that any decision successfully bringing
145
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primary elections under federal supervision opened a doorway
through which black claimants could use federal civil rights laws
to gain access to the southern political process. 151
Herbert Wechsler, who assumed a position as an assistant
in the United States Solicitor General’s office in 1940, recognized
the manner in which a victory for the plaintiffs in Classic could
pave the way for black entry into the political process in the
South. 152 Though he did not volunteer to participate in Classic
like he had in Herndon, Wechsler took Attorney General Robert H.
Jackson’s request that he write the brief as an opportunity to
expand minority access to the political process in the South. Key
to his argument was the notion that even though primary elections
were essentially private affairs, run by political parties out from
under the purview of state government, election commissioners in
primary elections were nevertheless operating “under color of law”
and therefore subject to prosecution under federal law. 153
Standing in Wechsler’s way was a Supreme Court ruling
decided in 1935 that held primary elections to essentially be
“private” matters beyond the reach of federal supervision. 154 This
case, Grovey v. Townsend, involved the claim of an African
American in Houston who had been denied the opportunity to vote
in the state’s all-white primary. 155 To distinguish Grovey from
Classic, Wechsler argued that Texas had not made the primary
“part of the electoral process” to the extent that Louisiana had. 156
For example, Louisiana had enacted legislation holding the state
responsible for providing “ballots,” “stationery,” and all other
“expenses necessary” to administer primary elections.157
Louisiana had also enacted an elaborate scheme by which disputed
primary results were resolved in state courts and the “form of the
primary ballot,” the “location of polling places,” and the “hours of
voting” were all established by the state. 158 For all these reasons,
Wechsler argued that the primary was an “integral” and
“dispositive” part of the general election in Louisiana, and that
private action interfering with that primary violated the right to
“choose” under Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution. 159
Impressed by Wechsler’s mastery of Louisiana voting law, Justice
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Stone relied heavily on his former clerk’s brief to decide that the
election officials had in fact violated federal law. 160
For civil rights lawyers like Thurgood Marshall, United
States v. Classic represented a significant departure from Grovey v.
Townsend, opening up the possibility that a frontal attack on the
southern white primary might succeed. 161 Yet, when Marshall
asked Wechsler to join him in a direct attack on the all-white
primary in Texas, Wechsler refused. 162 Part of this refusal had to
do with a conviction on Wechsler’s part that his participation in
Marshall’s appeal might actually jeopardize the case by making his
argument in Classic suddenly appear racially motivated. 163
Though it is impossible to tell whether this would have happened,
Marshall went on to use Classic as one of his primary cases for
challenging the all white Texas primary in Smith v. Allwright in
1944. 164 Marshall’s victory in Allwright marked a substantial
advancement for black access to the political process in the South,
a move closely in line with the “access” prong of footnote 4 of
Carolene Products. 165
United States v. Classic was not Wechsler’s only foray into
the question of black access to the political process in the Deep
South in the 1940s. In 1943 Attorney General Francis Biddle
asked him to put together a federal plan enabling servicemen
stationed overseas to vote. 166 To insure that members of the
military could participate in national elections, Wechsler drafted a
bill authorizing the War and Navy Departments to print ballots,
distribute them, and then report the results back to voters’ home
districts, ordering local registrars to count the votes. 167 At the
time, this involved what Wechsler remembered to be an “enormous
dislocation” of state control over the franchise, a move that
alarmed southern congressmen like Mississippi Representative
John Rankin, who feared that the measure would form “an opening
wedge” for Congress to begin “breaking down the
disfranchisement of blacks.” 168 Wechsler not only realized this
was a possibility, but put in extra effort on the bill precisely in the
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hopes that it would, one day, help African Americans in the
South. 169
In fact, Wechsler worked so hard that Rankin attacked him
personally during a confirmation hearing in 1944, deriding him as
“Weshler, who calls himself Wechsler,” in an attempt to impugn
his character by implying that he was a Jew masquerading as a
gentile. 170 Though Wechsler was in fact Jewish, Rankin seemed
blind to the fact that few members of Congress considered religion
to be relevant to the question of whether one could serve as an
effective Assistant Attorney General. Yet, Rankin’s jab illustrated
the manner in which Wechsler was himself reminded of the fact
that he belonged to a minority; a reminder that only reinforced his
awareness of the tenuous position that minorities generally held in
the United States. Indeed, Wechsler’s Judaism, though not
something that he stressed in his professional career, helps explain
his acute interest in how, precisely, the law might best be used to
preserve minority rights against the often abusive power of
majority rule. 171
Wechsler’s attempts at improving black access to the
political process in the American South in the 1940s both
resonated with the lessons he learned in the 1930s, and came to
inform his criticism of Brown in the 1950s. As we shall see in the
next section, one problem that Wechsler had with Brown was that
it did not hinge on a process-based approach to achieving civil
rights reform, but an equal protection claim rooted in the
psychological harm that segregation caused black children. While
this claim would appear sympathetic to many in the North,
Wechsler realized that it placed the Court in the difficult position
of assessing “ad hoc” sociological results. 172 As if that were not
enough, the Court had also made itself responsible for altering the
entire southern educational system, a job that it proved
fundamentally incapable of doing without the help of black mass
action.

IV. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND THE TROUBLE WITH BROWN
The efforts that Herbert Wechsler made to expand black
access to the political process in the 1930s and 1940s profoundly
influenced his approach to Supreme Court decisions in the 1950s,
169
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particularly decisions regarding race. Long attuned to the
difficulties of achieving racial reform through litigation alone,
Wechsler balked at a string of Supreme Court rulings from 1954 to
1959 that boldly set out to invalidate racial segregation in the
American South. To Wechsler, these opinions lacked doctrinal
consistency, defied popular opinion, and ignored many of the
lessons that he had learned while an ILD-affiliated lawyer and
federal official. In fact, by the spring of 1959, Wechsler came to
suspect that the Supreme Court was not only confusing
constitutional law but impeding the black struggle in the South.
At the heart of Wechsler’s concerns lay Brown v. Board of
Education. 173
Decided in May 1954, Brown marked the
culmination of a determined struggle by the NAACP to win a
Supreme Court ruling proclaiming southern segregated schools
unconstitutional. 174 Though the NAACP prevailed, it did so in a
way that struck Wechsler as problematic. For one, the NAACP did
not rely on the type of “mass defense” politics that the ILD had
once advocated in the 1930s. Instead, it plowed into the sensitive,
local issue of primary and secondary education with little
grassroots organizing or support. For another, the NAACP did not
rely on the type of neutral legal argument that Wechsler had
worked so hard to cobble together in Herndon, one that positioned
minority interests in a manner that appeared to advance majority
rights.
“The problem for me,” noted Wechsler in April 1959, was
“not that the Court had departed from its earlier decisions” or
“disturbed the settled patterns of a portion of the country,” but that
it had relied on faulty “reasoning.” 175 One problem that Wechsler
had with Brown’s reasoning was that the NAACP tailored its claim
narrowly, arguing that public school segregation should be
invalidated not because segregation was per se unconstitutional,
but because segregated schools had “a detrimental effect upon
[African American] children.” 176 To prove this, the Court cited
social science data assembled by sociologists like Kenneth B.
Clark, who used a variety of innovative techniques, including the
presentation of colored dolls to children, to prove that segregation
“has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development
of [African American youth.]” 177
Though Wechsler sympathized with the NAACP’s ultimate
goal of improving black life in the South, he worried about the
NAACP’s use of social science evidence to do so. Wechsler
173

Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
Kluger, supra note 162, at 703-06.
175
Wechsler, Principles, supra note 1, at 31-32.
176
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
177
Id.
174

30

believed that incorporating social science into law could be an
effective tool for policy makers, even legislators, but was a risky
proposition for courts. 178 Courts, in his opinion, worked best when
they relied on the “fixed ‘historical meaning’” of constitutional
provisions, provisions that were “neutral” and therefore able to be
applied equally to all parties at all times, no matter the immediate
outcome. 179 “A principled decision,” proclaimed Wechsler, rests
on “reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend
any immediate result that is involved.” 180 Cases that evaluated
sociological data, on the other hand, struck Wechsler as too
focused on particular interests. Not only did they presume an
unconstrained “freedom” to “appraise” the pros and cons of
“projected measures,” but if the projected measures in question
were contingent on scientific findings, then the Court’s authority
rested on it being knowledgeable in areas where it had, ironically,
little knowledge. 181
Driving
Wechsler’s
disapproval
of
sociological
jurisprudence was the fact that the Supreme Court had a long and
disreputable history of manipulating scientific data to arrive at
undemocratic ends. Much of its Lochner-era jurisprudence, for
example, had hinged on questionable assessments of scientific
evidence, including whether bakeries caused respiratory problems
and whether women should be limited in the amount of hours that
they could work. 182 Though the Court presented its decisions in
these cases as if they were based on objective fact, Wechsler
understood them to be something else. Its refusal to limit work
hours in bakeries in New York, for example, struck him as a move
against labor. 183 Its agreement to limit work hours for women,
conversely, struck him as a scientifically flimsy endorsement of
then-existing gender norms. 184
178
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Wechsler’s disapproval of Supreme Court justices
pretending to be scientists applied to Brown as well. 185 Though he
sympathized with the result of the opinion, he feared that the
Justices had gotten the sociology wrong. Rather than ameliorate
psychological harm, the South’s first experiments with public
school integration during the 1957-1958 school year actually
appeared to be exacerbating the damage to black students. This
became painfully obvious after nine black students integrated
Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. The nine students
gained admission to Central High from the local school board in
1957 and received no indication that their entry to the school
would be blocked. 186 Yet, as the school year approached,
Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus decided to turn the integration of
Central High into a political issue, ordering the Arkansas National
Guard to surround the school and refuse entry to the black
teenagers. 187 Claiming that he was afraid of white violence,
Faubus kept the soldiers at Central High until federal courts
intervened, ordering him to admit the students. 188 At that point,
Faubus dismissed the National Guard, allowing a white mob to
terrorize the nine students as they entered the school. 189 Press
footage of mobs beating innocent black victims prompted
President Eisenhower to intervene personally, ordering the 101st
Airborne into Little Rock to defend the black teenagers, a position
they would hold until the end of November, when they were finally
dismissed. 190
Almost immediately after federal forces left in November,
harassment from white students against their black peers
intensified. In a celebrated instance in December, a white
student’s insults prompted Minnie Jean Brown, one of the Little
Rock nine, to lose her temper and dump “food on [a] white boy,”
conduct for which she was promptly suspended. 191 One month
later, a white student named Darlene Holloway assaulted another
one of the African American girls at the school. 192 Holloway’s
attack sparked a wave of attacks that lasted through the 1958
spring semester as white students assaulted their black peers,
185
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struck them with purses, kicked them, showered them with food,
and intimidated them with signs encouraging them to leave. 193 In
one extreme case, a white student named Billy Ferguson even
threw an African American girl down a flight of stairs. 194
As day to day conditions for the African American students
in Central High School worsened, Minnie Jean Brown left for New
York. Following her second suspension from Central High School
in January 1958, Brown had received a scholarship to attend the
private New Lincoln School on West 110th Street in New York
City. 195 Convinced that white harassment would only continue in
Little Rock, Brown left Arkansas for New York in February. 196
Once there, she stayed with Kenneth Clark, the same social
scientist whose evidence had been used to invalidate segregation,
and was greeted by a representative of the Lincoln School and
“fifty delegates of city youth councils and high schools in New
York.” 197
Brown’s escape from Arkansas, coupled with the continued
harassment of the eight remaining black students that spring, all
made it into the New York Times and presumably onto Herbert
Wechsler’s breakfast table. To him, the students’ trials raised the
legitimate question of whether the NAACP had been correct in
making the argument that integration would cure the harm to black
children caused by segregation. “Was [the Court] comparing the
position of the [African American] child in a segregated school
with his position in an integrated school where he was happily
accepted and regarded by the whites,” wondered Wechsler, “or
was [the Court] comparing his position under separation with that
under integration where the whites were hostile to his presence and
found ways to make their feelings known?” 198 Wechsler’s
mention of “hostile” whites was not something that the Supreme
Court paid much attention to in 1954, yet it reflected the
experience of the Little Rock nine perfectly. It also went to one of
the central constitutional questions of the case, namely whether
integration provided a suitable remedy for the type of harm that the
NAACP had articulated in Brown. 199 “Only when the standing
193
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law, decisional or statutory, provides a remedy,” argued Wechsler
in 1959, “do courts have any business asking what the Constitution
may require or forbid.” 200
Though this position sounded
unsympathetic to black rights, it was firmly grounded in
constitutional law, going back to one of the central tenets of
Marbury v. Madison in 1803. 201
Wechsler’s interest in remedies helps explain his
reservations about the NAACP’s decision to pitch its constitutional
claim in terms of the psychological harm that segregation caused
black children. Rather than argue that segregation was per se
unconstitutional because it denied whites and blacks the freedom
to associate, for example, the NAACP decided to argue that
segregation was unconstitutional because it disproportionately
harmed black children in schools, thereby violating their right to
equal protection under the law. This was risky for several reasons.
One, the NAACP underestimated the harm that integration would
cause black children, as Little Rock revealed. Two, the NAACP
ignored a considerable amount of sociological research showing
that what happened in Little Rock was actually to be expected, as
integration tended to increase anxiety among minority students. 202
Respected scholars like Allison Davis and Kurt Lewin of
the Chicago School of Sociology, neither of whom had any vested
interest in preserving Jim Crow in the South, both held that
“proximity to the dominant group – not segregation – caused
psychological conflict and personality damage.” 203 If members of
subordinate groups were successfully segregated from dominant
groups, they argued, less psychological harm resulted. 204 Though
the NAACP omitted any mention of such findings in its Brown
brief, the question of integration’s psychological impact continued
to haunt the Supreme Court for the rest of the decade. In 1958, the
Little Rock School Board filed a petition before the Court
explaining that the first year of integrated learning had been
marked by “chaos, bedlam, and turmoil” in which there had been
“repeated incidents of more or less serious violence directed
against the Negro students.” 205 Lamenting that the education of
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the black students “had suffered,” something that anyone who read
the New York Times probably already knew, the School Board
asked for permission to postpone integration for another two
years. 206 Reluctant to grant Little Rock’s request, the Supreme
Court suddenly found itself casting about for another rationale to
justify desegregation besides the psychological harm that Jim
Crow schools caused blacks. 207 In Cooper v. Aaron, decided on
September 29, 1958, the Court found one in the due process
clause. 208 Acknowledging that “the educational progress of all the
students, white and colored . . . [had] suffered” under integration,
the Court nevertheless asserted that “[t]he right of a student not to
be segregated on racial grounds in schools is indeed so
fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of
due process of law.” 209
For scholars who had wondered about the validity of the
Court’s reasoning in Brown, Cooper provided little relief. The
decision did little to explain how the right to attend a desegregated
school had suddenly become “fundamental” on par with the right
to have legal counsel in a death penalty proceeding. The decision
also failed to explain how due process, which generally protected
individuals from having their life, liberty, and property taken
without procedural safeguards, applied to segregated schools.
While the Court had used the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment to validate desegregation in Washington D.C., where
the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply, it did not specify
whether it was relying on the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment in
Cooper, nor had it ever really explained how the Fifth Amendment
applied in its D.C. decision, Bolling v. Sharpe. 210
Wechsler found other problems with the Court’s
desegregation rulings as well. One such problem was that the
Court “did not declare, as many wished that it had, that the
fourteenth amendment forbids all racial lines in legislation,” but
rather that segregation simply had “no place” in public
education. 211 This meant that segregation might have retained “a
place” in other contexts – buses, parks, beaches, or golf courses –
unless of course the NAACP could prove that segregating children
in these contexts damaged them as well. To Wechsler’s dismay,
neither the NAACP nor the Supreme Court made any effort to
establish that segregation in contexts other than schools did harm
the psychological development of black youth. Nor did the
206
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NAACP or the Supreme Court articulate any other clearly defined
constitutional principle for ending segregation in other sectors of
southern life.
Instead, whenever the Supreme Court did face the
constitutionality of segregation in a particular context, it simply
cited to Brown. To take just a few examples, the Court used
Brown to invalidate segregation in public golf courses in Holmes v.
City of Atlanta in 1955. 212 One year later, the Court used Brown to
invalidate segregation on public buses in Gayle v. Browder. 213
Then, in 1958, the Court used Brown to invalidate segregation in
public parks in New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v.
Detiege. 214 Wechsler questioned the logic behind such rulings,
which omitted substantive opinions in favor of per curiam rulings
simply citing Brown. 215 “That these cases present a weaker case
against state segregation,” asserted Wechsler, “is not, of course,
what I am saying. I am saying that the question whether it is
stronger, weaker, or of equal weight appears to me to call for
principled decision.” 216
Wechsler’s yearning for a principled decision might not
have been so great had the Supreme Court enjoyed immediate
212
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compliance with Brown and its progeny. Unfortunately, however,
the Court confronted sustained resistance in the South. Only
months after the ruling, grassroots opposition began to form in
states like Mississippi. 217 By 1956, state legislatures in six
southern states embraced a legal program of interposition aimed at
discrediting the Supreme Court. 218
By the fall of 1957,
interposition and grassroots opposition joined in a full-blown
campaign of “massive resistance” against the Court. 219
Though northern audiences recoiled at the violence in Little
Rock, even they seemed ambivalent about integration when it
came to their children’s well-being. 220 This became obvious in
New York City in October 1957 when white parents in Brooklyn
resisted an attempt by the NAACP to have a school district in
Bedford Stuyvesant, a predominantly black neighborhood, rezoned
to incorporate white students. 221 Part of the hesitation resulted
from increasing violence at integrated schools in the BedfordStuyvesant and Bushwick neighborhoods. In November 1957, a
special grand jury called to investigate violence in New York
City’s public schools called for the assignment of police officers to
patrol hallways after reports of fights between students during
class time. 222 In January 1958, the principal of John Marshall
Junior High School, an integrated Brooklyn school that had
become the site of increasing disorder, including the rape of a
female student in the school’s basement, committed suicide by
jumping off the roof of his apartment building before being
scheduled to testify before a King’s County grand jury
investigating school violence. 223
Southern voices were quick to point to New York’s
problems as a sign that integration was poor policy. “I ‘would hate
to think what the metropolitan press would have done to us,’”
exclaimed Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, “if the Brooklyn
school violence had happened in Little Rock. . . . [P]eople are not
being told one tenth of the trouble about racial problems outside
the South.” 224 On February 5, 1958, Georgia Governor Herman
Talmadge announced that the citizens of Georgia were “deeply
217
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sympathetic with the citizens of Brooklyn in the difficulties they
are experiencing in maintaining the independence and integrity of
their public schools.” 225 Talmadge even went so far as to suggest
that “the President of the United States send Federal troops to
Brooklyn to preserve order in the public schools there in the same
manner that he did to force a new social order upon the public
schools of Little Rock, Arkansas.” 226
While Talmadge mocked, more serious figures chastised
the Supreme Court for plowing into a hotly contested political
question like segregated schools without adequate constitutional
armor, arguing that its jurisdiction should be severely curtailed. In
January 1958, Learned Hand, one of the most respected Federal
Circuit Judges in the United States, blasted the Supreme Court for
overstepping its constitutional bounds, acting like a “third
legislative chamber” and jeopardizing America’s democratic
system of government. 227 In his talk, Hand referenced a series of
decisions – all handed down since 1950 – that invalidated
popularly enacted law, including the segregation cases. According
to Hand, “nothing” in the Constitution explicitly granted the Court
the power to invalidate Jim Crow laws in the South. 228 The power
of judicial review was not, as he put it, “a logical deduction from
the structure of the Constitution,” but was instead a type of implied
right, a “practical condition,” as he put it, necessary to preserve
democratic government. 229 To Hand, issues like public school
segregation were not vital to national interests at all. 230 In fact, he
considered them to be little more than choices between “relative
values” that the Court had no business deciding. 231 Hand even
accused the Supreme Court of making a “dubious” grab for
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legislative power that did not “accord” with the “underlying
presuppositions of popular government.” 232
Others agreed, pushing for just the kind of congressionally
mandated limits on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction that Wechsler
had documented in his Federal Courts casebook. One year before
Hand delivered his lectures at Harvard, for example, Republican
Senator William Jenner from Indiana introduced a bill restricting
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in cases involving congressional
investigations and domestic security issues. 233 While domestic
security measures and segregation laws had little in common,
segregationists like Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland linked
them, painting the Court as a left-leaning lobby, intent on catering
to communists by abolishing national security measures and
attempting to level American society. 234 Interestingly, a former
Supreme Court clerk named William H. Rehnquist penned a
sensational expose in the U.S. News and World Report in
December 1957 supporting this view. 235 Rehnquist argued that
left-leaning clerks slanted memos recommending certiorari in a
way that threatened to influence their justices, pushing the Court to
the left. 236 While this claim drew obvious criticism, it reinforced
conservative fears that the nation’s highest tribunal was returning
to its power-hungry, Lochner-era days, albeit as a decidedly leftwing “legislative chamber.” 237
Though Wechsler too was alarmed at the Court’s “ad hoc”
jurisprudence, his fear was not that the Court had gone too far
down the road of liberal reform, but that it had gone down that
road in an inappropriate manner, jeopardizing its own authority in
the process. In fact, Wechsler feared that if the Court did not
modify its jurisprudence by making it more “neutral,” then rightwing detractors like Eastland, Jenner and even Rehnquist would
begin to chip away at the Court’s jurisdiction, compromising its
already limited power.
“Only the maintenance and the
improvement” of neutral standards of judicial review, argued
Wechsler, will “protect the Court against the danger of the
imputation of a bias favoring claims of one kind or another.” 238
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Even though Wechsler agreed that the Supreme Court’s power of
judicial review was “grounded in the language of the
Constitution,” he realized that there were limits to that power.239
Consequently, in cases “where there is room for drawing lines that
courts are not equipped to draw,” he argued, “I prefer to see the
issues faced through legislation.” 240
Wechsler’s interest in legislation reflected his longstanding
belief that courts played a “subordinate” role in the democratic
process, and should therefore refrain from overt declarations of
minority rights lest some kind of backlash ensue. 241 Indeed, this
had arguably already begun to happen by the spring of 1959. Not
satisfied with massive resistance, states across the South had
enacted a variety of measures aimed at preserving segregation
through more subtle means. These measures, the most popular of
which were called “pupil placement” or “assignment” plans,
removed any mention of race from southern state law but
nevertheless allowed local school boards to assign students to
schools based on factors linked indirectly to race. 242 In 1958, after
resistance to desegregation led President Eisenhower to send
federal troops into Little Rock, Arkansas the Supreme Court
declared interposition, and the political strategy of “massive
resistance” that accompanied it, invalid. 243 Yet, only two months
later the Court declared Alabama’s pupil placement statute to be
constitutional. 244 Though framed in tentative terms, the court’s
decision in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham could have been viewed
not only as an “ad hoc” ruling, but one that sanctioned skillful
white resistance. 245 Suddenly, the Court appeared to be siding
with southern states, against African Americans.
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The Supreme Court’s shift towards the South in the fall of
1958, coupled with increasing northern ambivalence regarding
desegregation that winter, help explain Wechsler’s critique of the
Supreme Court in April 1959. If not dead, Brown certainly seemed
to be dying. Though massive resistance was in decline, southern
states were shifting rapidly to newly sanctioned pupil placement
and assignment plans, keeping integration rates firmly below one
percent across most of the South. 246 Meanwhile, legal giants like
Learned Hand were joining southern segregationists like James O.
Eastland in calling for restrictions on the Supreme Court’s power.
To Wechsler, it was fast becoming imperative that the Court flee
the political thicket and move “toward” a different type of
constitutional jurisprudence, one that bolstered rather than
antagonized black participation in the political process. 247
Of course, Wechsler realized that the political process was
not particularly conducive to civil rights either. For example, he
had long understood the difficulty of getting Congress to rise
against southern state interests. 248 The Senate, in particular,
believed Wechsler, functioned “as the guardian of state interests,”
a role supported by the “operation of seniority,” and the power of
the “filibuster.” 249 Yet, despite the tendency of southern senators
to filibuster civil rights legislation, a Civil Rights Act had been
enacted in 1957 and congressional hearings for another bill were
underway in the spring of 1959, at the same time that Wechsler
delivered his Harvard address. 250 Thus, given the Supreme Court’s
backpedaling on school segregation, it is not surprising that
Wechsler felt there was more hope in the legislative realm than the
courts.
It is also possible that Wechsler continued to hope, as the
ILD had once hoped, that grassroots protest would emerge and
drive reform from below. Already, one of the most successful
stories of desegregation in the South in the 1950s came as a result
of mass organizing and direct action. From 1955 to 1956, a black
led bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama pressured local officials
into providing concessions to black riders on city buses, vaulting a
young black minister named Martin Luther King, Jr. onto the
national stage. 251 While Wechsler lamented the Supreme Court’s
handling of Gayle v. Browder, the case that came out of the
boycott, New York papers like the Times followed the
Montgomery protest closely, celebrating Martin Luther King, Jr.’s
246
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role in the demonstrations. 252 King’s own account of the
movement, Stride Toward Freedom, became popular reading
among intellectual elites in New York in 1958. It emphasized nonviolent direct action, not litigation, as the most effective means of
achieving social change. 253 As New Yorkers began sending
money to Montgomery, black ministers inspired by King and
disheartened by southern attempts to gut the 1957 Civil Rights Act
formed a mass protest organization called the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, or SCLC, partly as a counterpoint to the
more bureaucratic, litigation-oriented NAACP. 254 In February
1958, the SCLC mounted a grassroots effort to mobilize black
voters in twenty-two southern cities, a move that became known as
the Crusade for Citizenship. 255
Wechsler’s critique of the NAACP’s strategy in Brown,
coupled with his argument that the Court move “toward” a more
neutral approach to aiding the movement, coincided uncannily
with the movement’s own shift away from the NAACP’s litigation
strategy and towards “mass action” in 1957 and 1958. Indeed,
northern coverage of the burgeoning grassroots campaign in the
South helps explain Wechsler’s withering attack on Brown in April
1959. A veteran of the ILD’s mass politics campaigns of the
1930s, Wechsler recognized that strategies were shifting in the
South and that the time was ripe for the Court to adopt a more
grassroots-friendly, process-based approach. 256 Less than four
months after his Neutral Principles address was published in the
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Harvard Law Review, the opportunity to contribute to just such an
approach fell in his lap.

V. NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN AND THE PRESS IN THE
SOUTH
Herbert Wechsler was not the only proponent of racial
equality who recognized that a new approach to civil rights reform
was needed in 1959. Three months after the Harvard Law Review
published his Neutral Principles address, four black college
students at North Carolina Agricultural & Technical College
walked into an all white lunch counter in Greensboro and sat
down. 257 As news of their demonstration spread, black students in
Nashville,
Atlanta,
Memphis,
Richmond,
Tallahassee,
Montgomery and other southern cities followed suit.258
Interestingly, the student sit-ins of 1960 would provide
Wechsler with an opportunity to rejoin the black struggle in the
South, this time as a lawyer for the prestigious New York Times.
The events that would link Wechsler to the Times began when
black college students from Alabama State College engaged in a sit
down strike at a white lunch counter near the Montgomery
courthouse in 1960, prompting local officials to expel them from
school. 259 Later that month, Martin Luther King, Jr. publicly
endorsed the sit-ins, only to be arrested for lying on his state
income tax returns, a trumped up charge aimed at undermining his
leadership in Montgomery. 260 Fearing King’s incarceration, a civil
rights organization chaired by A. Philip Randolph, an icon of civil
rights in the 1930s, decided to take out a full-page advertisement in
the New York Times soliciting money for King’s legal defense.261
The ad mentioned King’s incarceration and the expulsion of the
student demonstrators, noting accurately that Alabama officials
were attempting to “demoralize Negro Americans and weaken
their will to struggle.” 262
Yet, the advertisement got key facts wrong. Instead of
describing the sit-in as the cause of the students being expelled, the
ad claimed that the students were arrested for singing “My
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Country, Tis of Thee” on the capitol steps. 263 The advertisement
then went on to charge that Montgomery police, “armed with
shotguns and tear-gas” surrounded the Alabama State College
Campus and locked black demonstrators out of a dining hall “in an
attempt to starve them into submission.” 264 None of this was true.
When Montgomery police commissioner L.B. Sullivan read the
advertisement, he was so outraged that he filed suit in state court
for libel. 265 Though the advertisement did not mention Sullivan’s
name once, Sullivan nevertheless charged that references made to
Montgomery police discredited him personally, as commissioner in
charge of police. 266 While this was not a particularly robust claim,
an all white jury quickly awarded him $500,000, a thenastronomical sum. 267 Stunned, the Times scrambled to mount an
appeal in Alabama’s Supreme Court, even as more libel suits from
Alabama officials started to roll in. 268 Afraid that the paper might
be sued into bankruptcy, Lewis Loeb, the lead attorney for the
Times, called Herbert Wechsler. 269
Wechsler immediately understood how libel suits could be
used to thwart black protest in the Deep South. 270 So long as
southern officials could drag northern newspapers and television
stations into court on libel charges, southern juries were likely to
rule against them, whether they had committed libel or not. 271
This could have had a stifling effect on freedom of the press,
essentially driving the northern press out of the South under fear of
bankruptcy. 272 Once the press was gone, northern audiences
would no longer learn about racial abuses in the South, reducing
the chance that they would continue to fund civil rights groups like
the one supporting King, not to mention federal civil rights
legislation. For Wechsler, who had already suggested that federal
legislation might be a more fruitful avenue of reform than the
courts, the consequences for civil rights could be dire. 273
Afraid that libel suits might choke the democratic process,
Wechsler requested that the Times allow him to make an argument
challenging “the accepted concepts about libel and the First
Amendment.” 274 Until then, libel law had been outside the realm
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of the First Amendment, prompting anyone accused of libel to
defend either on the basis that their claims were true, or that they
constituted “fair comment” based on a reasonable interpretation of
the facts. 275 Though Wechsler initially agreed to argue that the
Sullivan advertisement constituted fair comment, a negative ruling
by the Alabama Supreme Court convinced him that southern courts
would ignore facts simply so that they could use libel as a means
of punishing the northern press. 276 As “ten or twelve” additional
libel suits were filed against the Times, raising the paper’s
potential liability to “anywhere from ten to twenty million dollars”
Wechsler lobbied for a more aggressive approach, attacking libel
law generally as an infringement on freedom of the press. 277
At first, the Times expressed “considerable resistance” to
Wechsler’s idea. 278 Never having lost a libel case before, the
paper’s editors proved “reluctant” to “devote their prestige” to
upsetting an entire field of law that had been expressly “developed
for the protection of individual reputations.” 279 But, in a meeting
with the paper’s top editors, Wechsler convinced them of the
“potential for abuse” that the Alabama verdict represented, both to
the Times and to civil rights generally. 280 After some debate, the
paper’s editors agreed to let him argue their case before the
Supreme Court, pushing not just for an invalidation of the
Alabama court ruling, but a “progressive expansion of First
Amendment protection” to the field of libel. 281
It was a considerable victory for Wechsler, and well timed.
During the spring of 1963, as Wechsler drafted his Supreme Court
petition, the civil rights movement began to engage in some of its
most dramatic protests yet.
Beginning in April 1963,
demonstrators in Birmingham worked creatively to provoke
violent reactions from local police, hoping to gain coverage in the
national media. 282 In May, movement strategists even sent
hundreds of black school children into the streets to block traffic
and stir disorder, pushing police to order fire-hoses and dogs
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against the demonstrators, leading to some of the most dramatic
photographs of southern brutality yet. 283
By the time that Wechsler filed his brief in September
1963, the role of the press in advancing civil rights was growing, a
point that Wechsler emphasized to the Court. 284 “This is not a
time,” wrote Wechsler in his Sullivan brief, “to force the press to
curtail its attention to the tensest issues that confront the
country.” 285 Allowing the northern press to remain in the South
was necessary, he argued, to bring about “political and social
changes” that were desired by the people. 286 Of course, southern
white people did not want political or social change, but that was
precisely the point. With northern media coverage, black people
could gain the support of national audiences, tipping the scales
against the white South. 287
Yet, even as Wechsler understood the value of keeping
northern media in the South, so too did he recognize that libel law
had long been considered a state matter, beyond the reach of the
First Amendment. 288 This pushed him to make the claim that libel
of public officials was not being used to protect private reputation
so much as to quell “criticism of the government.” 289 As such, it
was akin to the doctrine of seditious libel, an unpopular offense
enacted by Congress in the Sedition Act of 1798. 290 Though the
Sedition Act had expired by the end of the Adams administration,
the Supreme Court had never formally ruled on its
constitutionality, leaving the question open as to whether state or
federal governments could punish seditious libel in the manner that
Montgomery officials were trying to do in Sullivan. Thus, by
digging into American legal history, Wechsler found a principle
for defending the Times that promised to help African Americans
in the South yet was racially neutral.
Impressed with Wechsler’s argument, the Supreme Court
held unanimously in favor of the Times. 291 Recognizing that the
civil rights movement’s “existence and objectives are matters of
the highest public interest,” Justice Brennan agreed with Wechsler
that to allow libel actions like Sullivan’s to succeed would be to
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“shackle the First Amendment.” 292 Although the Supreme Court
had ruled that the Constitution “does not protect libelous
publications” in other contexts, Brennan followed Wechsler in
distinguishing between private individuals and public officials,
arguing that libel suits against public officials violated freedom of
expression. 293 In fact, Brennan even relied on some of the same
quotes that Wechsler had used, noting that the First Amendment
was designed to “assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas”
necessary to bring about “political and social changes desired by
the people.” 294 Perhaps most remarkably, Brennan adopted
Wechsler’s analogy between Sullivan’s suit and the Sedition Act
of 1798. “Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this
Court,” wrote Justice Brennan, “the attack upon its validity has
carried the day in the court of history.” 295 Further, the judgment
awarded to Sullivan in Alabama was “one hundred times greater
than that provided by the Sedition Act.” 296 This meant that if the
Court allowed Sullivan’s victory to stand, a “pall of fear” would be
cast over “those who would give voice to public criticism” to the
point that the “First Amendment freedoms” could not “survive.” 297
It was a remarkable victory for Herbert Wechsler. Not only
had the Court adopted his expanded definition of the First
Amendment, but it effectively insulated northern newspapers and
television stations from a barrage of southern libel suits that could
have driven them from the South indefinitely. 298 This would
undeniably have impacted the success of the civil rights
movement. Already, movement activists in Mississippi were
planning to bring northern volunteers down to the Deep South for
“Freedom Summer,” hoping that they would raise national
awareness of racial injustice there. 299 Without the press, it is
unlikely that this campaign would have garnered much attention.
As it was, however, the deaths of three Freedom Summer
volunteers, Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew
Goodman became national news, making headlines for weeks. 300
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The presence of the northern press in the South played an
even greater role in the civil rights movement one year later,
during the opening months of 1965. Beginning in January, the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference decided to target a
small “inconspicuous” town in Alabama named Selma to build
national support for a federal Voting Rights Act.301 Aware that
local sheriff Jim Clark had developed an “impulsive” reputation
for using violence against demonstrators, SCLC staff members
planned a series of demonstrations to provoke Clark. 302 On
January 19, 1965, they achieved their first success when Clark
assaulted black protester Amelia Boynton in front of the
courthouse. 303 On January 24, they achieved an even greater
victory when fifty-three year old black demonstrator Annie Lee
Cooper punched Clark in the face, prompting him to strike her
repeatedly with his club. 304 Though Cooper had provoked the
attack, reporters for the New York Times and the Washington Post
only photographed Clark’s response, sending a powerful image of
segregationist brutality to the nation. 305 Still more sensational
images emerged on March 7, when 600 demonstrators marched
across the Edmund Pettus Bridge only to be routed by a cohort of
Clark’s deputies and state troopers who gassed, clubbed, and
whipped the demonstrators back to the other side of the river. 306
Video footage of the brutality made it onto national television that
night, while newspaper coverage exploded the following morning,
alerting the nation to the brutality of southern racism. 307
Though national support for black voting rights was
relatively high prior to March 1965, and President Johnson had
even begun efforts to draft voting rights legislation as early as
December 1964, news coverage of segregationist violence in
Selma greatly facilitated the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act. 308 Not only did press coverage ensure that the bill would be
enacted “with only minimal delay,” but it also ensured that there

Sends 200 Sailors to Aid Mississippi Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1964, at 1;
Claude Sitton, 400 Sailors Hunt 3 in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1964, at
23; Claude Sitton, Mississippi Force Expanded by F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1964, at 1; Claude Sitton, Graves at a Dam: Discovery is Made in New Earth
Mound in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1964, at 1; Claude Sitton,
Mississippi Rights Slaying Is Being Reconstructed – Arrests Awaited, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1964, at 1.
301
Garrow, Protest, supra note 282, at 31, 35-77.
302
Id. at 34, 42-43.
303
Id. at 43.
304
Id. at 45.
305
Id.
306
Id. at 73-77.
307
Garrow, Protest, supra note 282, at 78.
308
Id. at 38, 156-57.

48

would be no “weakening amendments.” 309 In fact, newspaper and
television coverage of the demonstrations produced a much more
robust piece of legislation, making the federal government an
active defender of black access to the southern political process. 310
Had Alabama officials like Clark been able to drive northern
newspapers and television stations out of the South with
astronomical libel suits, something Herbert Wechsler’s victory in
New York Times v. Sullivan prevented, it is unlikely that the 1965
Voting Rights Act would have been as strong as it was. 311

VI. CONCLUSION:

Herbert Wechsler’s victory in Sullivan was more than just a
triumph for the First Amendment; it was a victory for the civil
rights movement. While scholars have tended to focus on the
NAACP as the legal engine of the movement, at times debating the
wisdom of its emphasis on school desegregation, a close look at
Herbert Wechsler suggests that the NAACP was not alone in
engineering constitutional reform in the 1950s and 60s. 312 In fact,
Wechsler suggests that civil rights strategies forged in the 1930s
returned in the 1960s, with surprising results. A veteran of the
“mass defense” strategies of the International Labor Defense,
Wechsler’s victory in Sullivan represented a very different
approach to constitutional reform than the NAACP’s approach in
Brown, an approach that incorporated grassroots protest, the
media, and black access to the national political process. 313
309

Id. at 134.
Id. at 135.
311
Though David J. Garrow does not consider New York Times v. Sullivan in his
analysis of the Selma protests, his thesis hinges on the role that newspaper and
television coverage played in facilitating national legislation. Id. at 163.
312
For scholars who question the wisdom of Brown, see Goluboff, supra note
12, at 238-70. See also Mack, Rethinking, supra note 15, at 259-62 (discussing
academic criticism of Brown).
313
According to Pulitzer Prize winning journalists Gene Roberts and Hank
Klibanoff, Sullivan amounted to nothing less than a “form of liberation,” for
civil rights reporters in the region at the time, leaving northern media free to
report on black grassroots protest in the Deep South. See GENE ROBERTS &
HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE,
AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 364 (2006). For black reliance on the
northern media in 1963, see DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, 166-67 (1978).
According to Morton J. Horwitz , Sullivan’s suit could have prevented the press
from ever publishing anything “controversial” about the South, particularly
anything involving civil rights. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND
THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, 36 (1998).
310

49

By forcing public officials to prove malice in libel suits,
Sullivan helped keep the northern press in the Deep South, a move
that directly facilitated the civil rights movement’s direct action
campaigns in Mississippi in 1964 and Alabama in 1965. Without
press coverage of the demonstrations at Selma, scholars like David
J. Garrow have shown, a “national consensus” might never have
emerged in favor of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 314 This means
that Wechsler’s campaign to rewrite libel law, though it did not
address the question of black rights directly, facilitated the process
through which the civil rights movement would ultimately effect
change.
Wechsler’s contribution to a process-based approach to
reform, something the ILD stressed in the 1930s and that he
encouraged in the 1940s, pushes us not only to reconsider civil
rights lawyering in the 1960s, but legal liberalism generally at midcentury. According to historian Laura Kalman, legal liberalism
assumed two basic forms in the post-Brown era. The first,
“Warren Court activism,” stressed normative results over judicial
craft and descended directly from the legal realist revolt against
formalism led by progressive jurists in the 1920s, many of whom
stressed the use of social science data as a guide for deciding
cases. 315 The second, “legal process” approach, also derived from
legal realism but maintained that decisions based simply on social
science undermined the authority of the judiciary and needed to be
tempered with “reasoned elaboration” and an adherence to “neutral
principles” of law. 316
Though most scholars have tended to agree with Akhil
Reed Amar that legal process theorists “never fully succeeded in
coming to grips with” Brown, Wechsler’s strategic vision of how
neutrality could be used to advance minority interests suggests a
more nuanced story. 317 Brown, to Wechsler, represented legal
realism gone too far. 318 Not only did it provide no clear,
constitutional guideline for outlawing segregation in contexts other
than schools, it was scientifically shaky. Wechsler, an avid
supporter of social science in the criminal law context, suspected
314
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that the NAACP’s selection of scientific authorities was biased
towards the results it wanted to achieve. 319 Not only did the
NAACP ignore prominent theorists who argued that racial
integration damaged minority groups, they failed to anticipate the
terror that black children would confront in majority white schools.
By the spring of 1959, that terror had been carefully documented
by the New York Times in almost day to day coverage of the 19571958 school year in Little Rock, Arkansas. Further, white parents
in New York began to express ambivalence towards integration in
1958 as black emigrants streamed into neighborhoods like
Bedford-Stuyvesant and Bushwick, sparking interracial violence in
public schools. With no grassroots support and growing political
opposition in America’s most cosmopolitan city, Brown seemed,
by April 1959, to be on the ropes.
With Warren Court activism flailing, legal process came,
surprisingly, to the rescue. Wechsler’s resurrection of the First
Amendment in Sullivan in 1963 advanced black interests
substantially by opening up a crucial avenue of the political
process, the national press. This process-based approach coincided
closely with the rise of grassroots direct action protest in the South,
protest led by civil rights groups like the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, or SCLC. As civil rights historians like
Aldon Morris and David J. Garrow have shown, not only did the
rise of the SCLC represent a distinctly different approach to reform
than the “bureaucratic” court-centric approach pursued by the
NAACP, but its approach, ultimately, carried the day. 320 Through
grassroots organizing, mass demonstration, and strategic handling
of the media, civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. were
able to convince a majority of Americans that federal legislation
was needed to truly effect a Second Reconstruction.
Though Wechsler never belonged to any of the civil rights
organizations of the 1960s, he was affiliated with one of the
biggest civil rights organizations of the 1930s, the International
Labor Defense. 321 This suggests that the parallels between the
legal process theory that he advocated and the manner in which he
319
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approached questions of civil rights were more than just
coincidental. Precisely because Wechsler had been involved in the
“mass defense” approach to reform in the 1930s, he understood
how important it was for the civil rights movement to keep
channels of the political process open in the 1960s.
Rather than a development that failed the civil rights
movement, Wechsler’s particular brand of strategic liberalism
actually served the movement well by keeping lines of the political
process, particularly the press, open to black activists in the Deep
South. While Sullivan was certainly not alone in aiding the civil
rights movement, its emphasis on protecting the movement’s
access to the political process places it in a different category from
civil rights decisions like Brown v. Board of Education, which
centered on more fundamental rights-based claims. 322 For scholars
who argue that Brown provided little more than a “hollow hope” to
blacks, Sullivan provides another way of looking at law’s utility,
reinforcing claims by historian Michael J. Klarman that a processbased approach to reform might have provided more hope for real
change. 323 Indeed, even a cursory look at the movement’s gains
appears to bear this out. Not only did Sullivan contribute to the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, for example, but press coverage of
black mass action set the stage for the return of the federal courts
to the education context as well. After a retreat from the question
of segregated schools following Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham in
1958, the federal courts did not move forcefully to strike down
southern subterfuges in the education context until Judge John
Minor Wisdom called for “liquidation” of de jure segregation in
United States v. Jefferson County in 1966. 324 Conceding that “the
courts acting alone have failed,” Wisdom admitted that he would
not have decided Jefferson County had it not been for the civil
rights movement’s gains in 1964 and 1965. 325 This means that the
success of school integration in the South, to the extent it
succeeded, might have been due more to the direct action protest of
the civil rights movement than Brown.
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Even if scholars like Gerald N. Rosenburg overstate
Brown’s failings, it is still possible that historians have focused on
the wrong decision when it comes to assessing the Supreme
Court’s role in the civil rights movement. To take just one
example, Sullivan suggests that the Supreme Court in fact played
an important, albeit supporting, role in the larger story of black
mass action. 326 This story of law’s interrelationship with mass
action dates back to the 1930s and derives from a very different
vision of how the courts can be used to effect social change.
Herbert Wechsler, who predated John Hart Ely’s process theory by
at least two decades, captured this vision during his sustained
interaction with the long civil rights movement. 327
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